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Abstract
A guessing wiretapper’s performance on a Shannon cipher system is analyzed for a source with memory. Close relationships
between guessing functions and length functions are first established. Subsequently, asymptotically optimal encryption and attack
strategies are identified and their performances analyzed for sources with memory. The performance metrics are exponents
of guessing moments and probability of large deviations. The metrics are then characterized for unifilar sources. Universal
asymptotically optimal encryption and attack strategies are also identified for unifilar sources. Guessing in the increasing order
of Lempel-Ziv coding lengths is proposed for finite-state sources, and shown to be asymptotically optimal. Finally, competitive
optimality properties of guessing in the increasing order of description lengths and Lempel-Ziv coding lengths are demonstrated.
Index Terms
cipher systems, compression, cryptography, guessing, Lempel-Ziv code, length function, minimum description length, sources
with memory, source coding, unifilar, universal source coding
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the classical Shannon cipher system [1]. Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn) be a message where each letter takes
values on a finite set X. This message should be communicated securely from a transmitter to a receiver, both of which have
access to a common secure key Uk of k purely random bits independent of Xn. The transmitter computes the cryptogram
Y = fn(X
n, Uk) and sends it to the receiver over a public channel. The cryptogram may be of variable length. The function
fn is invertible given Uk. The receiver, knowing Y and Uk, computes Xn = f−1n (Y, Uk). The functions fn and f−1n are
published. An attacker (wiretapper) has access to the cryptogram Y , knows fn and f−1n , and attempts to identify Xn without
knowledge of Uk. The attacker can use knowledge of the statistics of Xn. We assume that the attacker has a test mechanism
that tells him whether a guess Xˆn is correct or not. For example, the attacker may wish to attack an encrypted password
or personal information to gain access to, say, a computer account, or a bank account via internet, or a classified database
[2]. In these situations, successful entry into the system or a failure provides the natural test mechanism. We assume that
the attacker is allowed an unlimited number of guesses. Given the probability mass function (PMF) of Xn, the function fn,
and the cryptogram Y , the attacker can determine the posterior probabilities of the message PXn|Y (· | y). His best guessing
strategy having observed Y = y is then to guess in the decreasing order of these posterior probabilities PXn|Y (· | y). The key
rate for the system is k/n = R which represents the number of bits of key used to communicate one message letter.
Merhav and Arikan [2] study discrete memoryless sources (DMS) in the above setting and characterize the best attainable
moments of the number of guesses that the attacker has to submit before success. In particular, they show that for a DMS with
the governing single letter PMF P on X, the value of the optimal guessing exponent is given by
E(R, ρ) = max
Q
[ρmin{H(Q), R} −D(Q ‖ P )] ,
where the maximization is over all PMFs Q on X, H(Q) is the Shannon entropy of the PMF Q, and D(Q ‖ P ) is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence between Q and P . They also show that E(R, ρ) equals ρR for R < H(P ), and equals the
constant ρH1/(1+ρ)(P ) for R > H(Pρ). When R < H(P ), the key rate is not sufficiently large, and an exhaustive key-
search attack is asymptotically optimal. When R > H(Pρ), the randomness introduced by the key is near perfect, and the
cryptogram is useless to the attacker. The attacker submits guesses based directly on the message statistics, and ρH1/(1+ρ)(P )
is known to be the optimal guessing exponent in this scenario [3], where H1/(1+ρ)(P ) is the Re´nyi entropy of the DMS P . For
H(P ) < R < H(Pρ), the optimal strategy makes use of both the key and the message statistics. Pρ is the PMF of an auxiliary
DMS given by (47). Merhav and Arikan [2] also determine the best achievable performance based on the large deviations of
the number of guesses for success, and show that it equals the Fenchel-Legendre transform of E(R, ρ) as a function of ρ.
Secret messages typically come from the natural languages which can be well-modeled as sources with memory, for e.g., a
Markov source of an appropriate order. In this paper, we extend the results of Merhav and Arikan [2] to sources with memory.
As a first step towards this, we first consider the perfect secrecy scenario (for e.g., those analogous to R ≥ H(Pρ) in the DMS
case), and identify a tight relationship between the number of guesses for success and a lossless source coding length function.
Specifically, we sandwich the number of guesses on either side by a suitable length function. Arikan’s result [3] that the best
value of the guessing exponent for memoryless sources is the Re´nyi entropy of an appropriate order immediately follows by
recognizing that it is the least value of an average exponential coding length problem proposed and solved by Campbell [4]. Our
approach based on length functions has the benefit of showing that guessing in the increasing order of lengths of compressed
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1strings can yield a good attack strategy for sources with memory. In particular, guessing in the increasing order of Lempel-Ziv
code lengths [5] for finite-state sources and increasing description lengths for unifilar sources [6] are asymptotically optimal
in a sense made precise in the sequel.
Next, we establish similar connections between guessing and source compression for the key-constrained scenarios (i.e.,
those analogous to R < H(Pρ) in the memoryless case). We then study guessing exponents for the cipher system on sources
with memory, and then specialize our results to show that all conclusions of Merhav and Arikan in [2] for memoryless sources
extend to unifilar sources. We also consider the large deviations performance of the number of guesses and show that attacks
based on the Lempel-Ziv coding lengths and minimum description lengths are asymptotically optimal for finite-state and unifilar
sources, respectively. We then establish competitive optimality results for guessing based on these two length functions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we study guessing under perfect secrecy and establish the relationship between
guessing and source compression. In Section III, we study the key-rate constrained system, establish optimal strategies for both
parties for sources with memory, and study the relationship between guessing and a new source coding problem. In Section
IV, we characterize the performance for unifilar sources. In Section V, we study the large deviations performance and establish
the optimality properties of guessing based on Lempel-Ziv and minimum description lengths. Section VI summarizes the paper
and presents some open problems.
II. GUESSING UNDER PERFECT SECRECY AND SOURCE COMPRESSION
Let us first consider the following ideal setting where k = nR ≥ n log |X|. Enumerate all the sequences in Xn from 0 to
|X|n − 1 and let the function fn be the bit-wise XOR of the key bits and the bits representing the index of the message.
The cryptogram is the message whose index is the output of fn. The decryption function is also clear - simply XOR the bits
representing the cryptogram with the key bits. Such an encryption renders the cryptogram completely useless to an attacker
who does not have knowledge of the key. The attacker’s optimal strategy is to guess the message in the decreasing order of
message probabilities. In case the attacker does not have access to the message probabilities, a robust strategy is needed. We
first relate the problem of guessing to one of source compression. As we will see soon, robust source compression strategies
lead to robust guessing strategies.
For ease of exposition, and because we have perfect encryption, let us assume that the message space is simply X. The
extension to strings of length n is straightforward.
A guessing function
G : X→ {1, 2, · · · , |X|}
is a bijection that denotes the order in which the elements of X are guessed. If G(x) = i, then the ith guess is x. A length
function
L : X→ N
is one that satisfies Kraft’s inequality ∑
x∈X
2−L(x) ≤ 1. (1)
To each guessing function G, we associate a PMF QG on X and a length function LG as follows.
Definition 1: Given a guessing function G, we say QG defined by
QG(x) = c
−1 ·G(x)−1, ∀x ∈ X, (2)
is the PMF on X associated with G. The quantity c in (2) is the normalization constant. We say LG defined by
LG(x) = ⌈− logQG(x)⌉ , ∀x ∈ X, (3)
is the length function associated with G.
Observe that
c =
∑
a∈X
G(a)−1 =
|X|∑
i=1
1
i
≤ 1 + ln |X|, (4)
and therefore the PMF in (2) is well-defined. We record the intimate relationship between these associated quantities in the
following result.
Proposition 2: Given a guessing function G, the associated quantities satisfy
c−1 ·QG(x)−1 = G(x) ≤ QG(x)−1, (5)
LG(x)− 1− log c ≤ logG(x) ≤ LG(x). (6)
Proof: The first equality in (5) follows from the definition in (2), and the second inequality from the fact that c ≥ 1.
2The upper bound in (6) follows from the upper bound in (5) and from (3). The lower bound in (6) follows from
logG(x) = log
(
c−1 ·QG(x)−1
)
= − logQG(x)− log c
≥ (⌈− logQG(x)⌉ − 1)− log c
= LG(x) − 1− log c.
We now associate a guessing function GL to each length function L.
Definition 3: Given a length function L, we define the associated guessing function GL to be the one that guesses in the
increasing order of L-lengths. Messages with the same L-length are ordered using an arbitrary fixed rule, say the lexicographic
order on X. We also define the associated PMF QL on X to be
QL(x) =
2−L(x)∑
a∈X 2
−L(a)
. (7)
Proposition 4: For a length function L, the associated PMF and the guessing function satisfy the following:
1) GL guesses messages in the decreasing order of QL-probabilities;
2)
logGL(x) ≤ logQL(x)−1 ≤ L(x). (8)
Proof: The first statement is clear from the definition of GL and from (7).
Letting 1{E} denote the indicator function of an event E, we have as a consequence of statement 1) that
GL(x) ≤
∑
a∈X
1 {QL(a) ≥ QL(x)}
≤
∑
a∈X
QL(a)
QL(x)
= QL(x)
−1, (9)
which proves the left inequality in (8). This inequality was known to Wyner [7].
The last inequality in (8) follows from (7) and Kraft’s inequality (1) as follows:
QL(x)
−1 = 2L(x) ·
∑
a∈X
2−L(a) ≤ 2L(x).
Let {L(x) ≥ B} denote the set {x ∈ X | L(x) ≥ B}. We then have the following easy to verify corollary to Propositions
2 and 4.
Corollary 5: For a given G, its associated length function LG, and any B ≥ 1, we have
{LG(x) ≥ B + 1 + log c}
⊆ {G(x) ≥ 2B}
⊆ {LG(x) ≥ B} . (10)
Analogously, for a given L, its associated guessing function GL, and any B ≥ 1, we have
{GL(x) ≥ 2B} ⊆ {L(x) ≥ B}. (11)
The inequalities between the associates in (6) and (8) indicate the direct relationship between guessing moments and
Campbell’s coding problem [4], and that the Re´nyi entropies are the optimal growth exponents for guessing moments. See (14)
below. They also establish a simple and new result: the minimum expected value of the logarithm of the number of guesses
is close to the Shannon entropy.
We now demonstrate other relationships between guessing moments and average exponential coding lengths which will be
useful in establishing universality properties.
Proposition 6: Let L be any length function on X, GL the guessing function associated with L, P a PMF on X, ρ ∈ (0,∞),
L∗ the length function that minimizes E
[
2ρL
∗(X)
]
, where the expectation is with respect to P , G∗ the guessing function that
proceeds in the decreasing order of P -probabilities and therefore the one that minimizes E [G∗(X)ρ], and c as in (4). Then
E [GL(X)ρ]
E [G∗(X)ρ]
≤ E
[
2ρL(X)
]
E
[
2ρL∗(X)
] · 2ρ(1+log c). (12)
3Analogously, let G be any guessing function, and LG its associated length function. Then
E [G(X)ρ]
E [G∗(X)ρ]
≥ E
[
2ρLG(X)
]
E
[
2ρL∗(X)
] · 2−ρ(1+log c). (13)
Also, ∣∣∣∣1ρ logE [G∗(X)ρ]− 1ρ logE
[
2ρL
∗(X)
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 + log c. (14)
Proof: Observe that
E
[
2ρL(X)
]
≥ E [GL(X)ρ] (15)
≥ E [G∗(X)ρ]
≥ E
[
2ρLG∗(X)
]
2−ρ(1+log c) (16)
≥ E
[
2ρL
∗(X)
]
2−ρ(1+log c), (17)
where (15) follows from (8), and (16) from the left inequality in (6). The result in (12) immediately follows. A similar argument
shows (13). Finally, (14) follows from the inequalities leading to (17) by setting L = L∗.
Thus if we have a length function whose performance is close to optimal, then its associated guessing function is close to
guessing optimal. The converse is true as well. Moreover, the optimal guessing exponent is within 1 + log c of the optimal
coding exponent for the length function.
Let us now consider strings of length n. Let Xn denote the set of messages and consider n→∞. It is now easy to see that
universality in the average exponential coding rate sense implies existence of a universal guessing strategy that achieves the
optimal exponent for guessing. For each source in the class, let Pn be its restriction to strings of length n and let L∗n denote an
optimal length function that attains the minimum value E
[
2ρL
∗
n(X
n)
]
among all length functions, the expectation being with
respect to Pn. On the other hand, let Ln be a sequence of length functions for the class of sources that does not depend on
the actual source within the class. Suppose further that the length sequence Ln is asymptotically optimal, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
nρ
logE
[
2ρLn(X
n)
]
= lim
n→∞
1
nρ
logE
[
2ρL
∗
n(X
n)
]
,
for every source belonging to the class. Ln is thus “univeral” for (i.e., asymptotically optimal for all sources in) the class. An
application of (12) by denoting c in (12) as cn followed by the observation (1 + log cn)/n → 0 shows that the sequence of
guessing strategies GLn is asymptotically optimal for the class, i.e.,
lim
n→∞
1
nρ
logE [GLn(X
n)ρ]
= lim
n→∞
1
nρ
logE [G∗(Xn)ρ] .
Arikan and Merhav [8] provide a universal guessing strategy for the class of discrete memoryless sources (DMS). For the
class of unifilar sources with a known number of states, the minimum description length encoding is asymptotically optimal
for Campbell’s coding length problem (see Merhav [6]). It follows as a consequence of the above argument that guessing in
the increasing order of description lengths is asymptotically optimal. (See also the development in Section IV). The left side
of (12) is the extra factor in the expected number of guesses (relative to the optimal value) due to lack of knowledge of the
specific source in class. Our prior work [9] characterizes this loss as a function of the uncertainty class.
III. GUESSING WITH KEY-RATE CONSTRAINTS AND SOURCE COMPRESSION
We continue to consider strings of length n. Let Xn be a message and Uk the secure key of purely random bits independent
of Xn. Recall that the transmitter computes the cryptogram Y = fn(Xn, Uk) and sends it to the receiver over a public channel.
Given a PMF of Xn, the function fn, and the cryptogram Y , the attacker’s optimal strategy is to guess in the decreasing
order of posterior probabilities PXn|Y (· | y). Let us denote this optimal attack strategy as Gfn . The key rate for the system is
k/n = R < log |X|. If the attacker does not know the source statistics, a robust guessing strategy is needed. The following is
a first step in this direction.
Proposition 7: Let Ln be an arbitrary length function on Xn. There is a guessing list G such that for any encryption function
fn, we have
G(xn | y) ≤ 2min
{
2nR, 2Ln(x
n)
}
.
4Proof: We use a technique of Merhav and Arikan [2]. Let GLn denote the associated guessing function that proceeds
in the increasing order of the lengths and completely ignores the cryptogram. Let GLn proceed in the order xn1 , xn2 , · · · . By
Proposition 2, we need at most 2Ln(xn) guesses to identify xn.
Consider the alternative exhaustive key-search attack defined by the following guessing list:
f−1n
(
y, uk1
)
, f−1n
(
y, uk2
)
, · · · ,
where uk1 , uk2 , · · · is an arbitrary ordering of the keys. This strategy identifies xn in at most 2nR guesses.
Finally, let G(· | y) be the list that alternates between the two lists, skipping those already guessed, i.e., the one that proceeds
in the order {
xn1 , f
−1
n
(
y, uk1
)
, xn2 , f
−1
n
(
y, uk2
)
, · · ·} . (18)
Clearly, for every xn, we need at most twice the minimum of the two original lists.
We now look at a weak converse to the above in the expected sense. Our proof also suggests an asymptotically optimal
encryption strategy for sources with memory.
Proposition 8: Fix n ∈ N, ρ > 0, and let cn denote the constant in (4) as a function of n with Xn replacing X. There is an
encryption function fn and a length function Ln such that every guessing strategy G(· | y) (and in particular Gfn ) satisfies
E [G(Xn | Y )ρ]
≥ 1
(2cn)ρ(2 + ρ)
E
[(
min
{
2Ln(X
n), 2nR
})ρ]
.
Proof: The proof is an extension of Merhav and Arikan’s proof of [2, Th. 1] to sources with memory. The idea is to
identify an encryption mechanism that maps messages of roughly equal probability to each other.
Let Pn be any PMF on Xn. Enumerate the elements of Xn in the decreasing order of their probabilities. For convenience,
let M = 2nR. If M does not divide |X|n, append a few dummy messages of zero probability to make the number of messages
N a multiple of M . Index the messages from 0 to N − 1. Henceforth, we identify a message by its index.
Divide the messages into groups of M so that message m belongs to group Tj , where j = ⌊m/M⌋, and ⌊·⌋ is the floor
function. Enumerate the key streams from 0 to M − 1, so that 0 ≤ u ≤ M − 1. The function fn is now defined as follows.
For m = jM + i set
fn(jM + i, u)
∆
= jM + (i⊕ u) ,
where i ⊕ u is the bit-wise XOR operation. Thus messages in group Tj are encrypted to messages in the same group. The
index i identifying the specific message in group Tj , i.e., the last nR bits of m, are encrypted via bit-wise XOR with the key
stream. Given u and the cryptogram, decryption is clear – perform bit-wise XOR with u on the last nR bits of y.
Given a cryptogram y, the only information that the attacker gleans is that the message belongs to the group determined by
y. Indeed, if y ∈ Tj
Pn {Y = y} = 1
M
Pn {Xn ∈ Tj}
and therefore
Pn {Xn = m | Y = y} =
{
Pn{X
n=m}
Pn{Xn∈Tj}
, ⌊m/M⌋ = j,
0, otherwise,
decreases with m for m ∈ Tj , and is 0 for m /∈ Tj . The attacker’s best strategy Gfn(· | y) is therefore to restrict his guesses
to Tj and guess in the order jM, jM + 1, · · · , jM +M − 1. Thus, when xn = jM + i, the optimal attack strategy requires
i+ 1 guesses.
5We now analyze the performance of this attack strategy as follows.
E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ]
=
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{Xn = jM + i}(i+ 1)ρ
≥
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{Xn = (j + 1)M − 1}(i+ 1)ρ (19)
≥
N/M−1∑
j=0
Pn{Xn = (j + 1)M − 1}M
1+ρ
1 + ρ
(20)
≥ 1
1 + ρ
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{Xn = (j + 1)M + i}Mρ
(21)
=
1
1 + ρ
N−1∑
m=M
Pn{Xn = m}Mρ (22)
where (19) follows because the arrangement in the decreasing order of probabilities implies that
Pn{Xn = jM + i} ≥ Pn{Xn = (j + 1)M − 1}
for i = 0, · · · ,M − 1. Inequality (20) follows because
M−1∑
i=0
(i+ 1)ρ =
M∑
i=1
iρ ≥
∫ M
0
zρ dz =
M1+ρ
1 + ρ
,
(21) follows because by the decreasing probability arrangement
Pn{Xn = (j + 1)M − 1} ≥ 1
M
M−1∑
i=0
Pn{Xn = (j + 1)M + i}.
Thus (22) implies that
N−1∑
m=0
Pn{Xn = m} (min{m+ 1,M})ρ
=
M−1∑
m=0
Pn{Xn = m}(m+ 1)ρ +
N−1∑
m=M
Pn{X = m}Mρ
≤ E [Gfn(Xn|Y )ρ] + (1 + ρ)E [Gfn(Xn|Y )ρ]
= (2 + ρ)E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ] , (23)
Set GP to be the guessing function that guesses in the decreasing order of P -probabilities without regard to Y , i.e., GP (m) =
m+ 1. Let LGP be the associated length function. Now use (23) and (6) to get
E [Gfn(X
n|Y )ρ]
≥ 1
2 + ρ
E [(min {GP (Xn),M})ρ]
≥ 1
2 + ρ
E
[(
min
{
2LGP (X
n)
2cn
,M
})ρ]
≥ 1
(2cn)ρ(2 + ρ)
E
[(
min
{
2LGP (X
n),M
})ρ]
.
Since Gfn is the strategy that minimizes E [G(Xn | Y )ρ] , the proof is complete.
For a given ρ > 0, key rate R > 0, encryption function fn, define
En(R, ρ)
∆
= sup
fn
1
n
logE [Gfn(X
n | Y )ρ] .
6Propositions 7 and 8 naturally suggest the following coding problem: identify
En,l(R, ρ)
∆
= min
Ln
1
n
logE
[(
min
{
2Ln(X
n), 2nR
})ρ]
. (24)
Analogous to (14), we can relate En(R, ρ) and En,l(R, ρ) for a specified key rate R. The following is a corollary to Propositions
7 and 8.
Corollary 9: For a given R, ρ > 0, we have
|En,l(R, ρ)− En(R, ρ)| ≤ log(2
2ρcρn(2 + ρ))
n
.
Proof: Let L∗n be the length function that achieves En,l(R, ρ). By Proposition 7, and after taking expectations, we have
the guessing strategy G(· | y) that satisfies
E
[(
min
{
2L
∗
n(X
n), 2nR
})ρ]
≥ sup
fn
1
2ρ
E [G(Xn | Y )ρ]
≥ sup
fn
1
2ρ
E [Gfn(X
n | Y )ρ]
≥ 1
22ρcρn(2 + ρ)
E
[(
min
{
2Ln(X
n), 2nR
})ρ]
for a particular fn and Ln guaranteed by Proposition 8
≥ 1
22ρcρn(2 + ρ)
E
[(
min
{
2L
∗
n(X
n), 2nR
})ρ]
.
Take logarithms and normalize by n to get the bound.
The magnitude of the difference between En(R, ρ) and En,l(R, ρ) vanishes as n → ∞. Thus, the problem of finding the
optimal guessing exponent is the same as that of finding the optimal exponent for a coding problem. When R ≥ log |X|, the
coding problem in (24) reduces to the one considered by Campbell in [4]. Proposition 7 shows that the optimal length function
attaining the minimum in (24) yields an asymptotically optimal attack strategy on the cipher system. Moreover, the encryption
strategy in Proposition 8 is asymptotically optimal.
The following Proposition upper bounds the guessing effort needed to identify the correct message for sources with memory.
A sharper result analogous to the DMS case is shown later for unifilar sources.
Proposition 10: For a given R, ρ > 0, we have
lim sup
n→∞
En(R, ρ) ≤ min
{
ρR, lim sup
n→∞
En(ρ)
}
, (25)
where
En(ρ)
∆
= min
Ln
1
n
logE
[
2ρLn(X
n)
]
.
Proof: By Corollary 9, it is sufficient to show that the sequence En,l(R, ρ) is upperbounded by the sequence on the right
side of (25). Let L∗n be the length function that minimizes E
[
2ρLn(X
n)
]
. Observe that min
{
2ρnR, x
}
is a concave function
of x for a fixed ρ and R. Jensen’s inequality then yields
E
[
min
{
2ρnR, 2ρL
∗
n(X
n)
}]
≤ min
{
2ρnR,E
[
2ρL
∗
n(X
n)
]}
.
Take logarithms, normalize by n, and use the definition of En,l(ρ,R) to get
En,l(R, ρ) ≤ 1
n
log
(
min
{
2ρnR,E
[
2ρL
∗
n(X
n)
]})
= min
{
ρR,
1
n
logE
[
2ρL
∗
n(X
n)
]}
.
Now take the limsup as n→∞ to complete the proof.
Our results thus far are applicable to a rather general class of sources with memory. In the next section, we specialize our
results to the important class of unifilar sources. If the source is a DMS with defining PMF P , then the second term within
the min in (25) is known to be ρH1/(1+ρ)(P ), where H1/(1+ρ)(P ) is Re´nyi’s entropy of order 1/(1 + ρ) for the source. For
unifilar sources, we soon show that the limsup can be replaced by a limit which equals ρ times a generalization of the Re´nyi
entropy for such a source.
7IV. UNIFILAR SOURCES
In this section, we generalize the DMS results of Merhav and Arikan [2] to unifilar sources. We first make some definitions
largely following Merhav’s notation in [6].
Let xn = (x1, · · · , xn) be a string taking values in Xn. The string xn needs to be guessed. Let sn = (s1, · · · , sn) be another
sequence taking values in Sn where |S| <∞. Let s0 ∈ S be a fixed initial state. A probabilistic source Pn is finite-state with
|S| states [6] if the probability of observing the sequence pair (xn, sn) is given by
Pn(x
n, sn) =
n∏
i=1
P (xi, si | si−1),
where P (xi, si | si−1) is the joint probability of letter xi and state si given the previous state si−1. The dependence of Pn on
the initial state s0 is implicit. Typically, the letter sequence xn is observable and the state sequence sn is not. Let H denote
the entropy-rate of a finite-state source, i.e.,
H
∆
= − lim
n→∞
n−1
∑
xn∈Xn
Pn(x
n) logPn(x
n).
A finite-state source is unifilar [10, p.187] if the state si is given by a deterministic mapping φ : X× S→ S as
si = φ(xi, si−1),
and the mapping x 7→ φ(x, s) is one-to-one 1 for each s ∈ S. Given s0 and the sequence xn, the state sequence is uniquely
determined. Moreover, given s0 and the state sequence sn, xn is uniquely determined. An important example of a unifilar
source is a kth order Markov source where si = (xi, xi−1, · · · , xi−k+1).
Fix xn ∈ Xn. For s ∈ S, x ∈ X, let
Qxn(x, s) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1{xi = x, si−1 = s},
where 1{A} is the indicator function of the event A. Qxn is thus an empirical PMF on S× X. Let
Qxn(s) =
∑
x∈X
Qxn(x, s).
The use of Qxn for both the joint and the marginal PMFs is an abuse of notation. The context should make the meaning clear.
Let
qxn(x | s) =
{
Qxn(x, s)/Qxn(s), Qxn(s) > 0,
0, Qxn(s) = 0
denote the empirical letter probability given the state. (Given that φ is one-to-one, this actually defines a transition probability
matrix on the state space). Denote the empirical conditional entropy as
H(Qxn) = −
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
Qxn(x, s) log qxn(x|s),
and the conditional Kullback-Leibler divergence between the empirical conditional PMF and the one-step transition matrix
P (x|s) as
D(Qxn ‖ P ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
Qxn(x, s) log
qxn(x | s)
P (x | s) .
Given that we are dealing with multiple random variables, H(Q) and D(Q ‖ P ) usually stand for joint entropy and Kullback-
Leibler divergence of a pair of joint distributions. We however alert the reader that they stand for conditional values in our
notation.
Let us further define the type Txn of a sequence xn as follows:
Txn = {an ∈ Xn | Qan = Qxn} .
For the unifilar source under consideration, it is easy to see that
Pn(x
n) = 2−n(H(Qxn )+D(Qxn‖P )), (26)
i.e., all elements of the same type have the same probability. Moreover, for a fixed type Qxn , if we set P (x | s) = qxn(x | s)
and observe that for the resulting unifilar source matched to xn, we have 1 ≥ Pn{Txn} = |Txn |Pn(xn), we easily deduce
from (26) that
|Txn | ≤ 2nH(Qxn ). (27)
1The definition in [6] does not restrict φ to be one-to-one.
8Consequently, for any unifilar Pn,
Pn{Txn} ≤ 2−nD(Qxn‖P ). (28)
Using the fact that the mapping x 7→ φ(x, s) is one-to-one for each s, it is possible to get the following useful lower bounds
on the size and probability of a type for unifilar sources.
Lemma 11: (Merhav [6, Lemma 1], Gutman [11, Lemma 1]) For a unifilar source, there exists a sequence ε(n) =
Θ(n−1 logn) such that ∣∣∣∣ 1n logPn {Txn}+D(Qxn ‖ P )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(n) (29)
for every xn ∈ Xn.
Consequently, we also have ([6, eqn. (17)]):
∣∣∣∣ 1n log |Txn | −H(Qxn)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(n). (30)
Let us now define in a fashion analogous to the DMS case
E(R, ρ)
∆
= max
Q
[ρh(Q,R)−D(Q ‖ P )] (31)
where h(Q,R) = min{H(Q), R}, Q is a joint PMF on S × X with letter probabilities given the state identified by q(x | s),
and H(Q) is the conditional entropy
H(Q) = −
∑
s∈S
∑
x∈X
Q(x, s) log q(x | s).
P (x|s) is the conditional PMF that defines the unifilar source. The string s0 is irrelevant in the definition of E(R, ρ).
We now state and prove a generalization of the Merhav and Arikan result [2, Th. 1].
Theorem 12: For any unifilar source, any ρ > 0,
lim
n→∞
En(R, ρ) = E(R, ρ).
Proof: We show that the limiting value of En,l(R, ρ) exists for the corresponding coding problem and equals E(R, ρ).
Corollary 9 then implies that En(R, ρ) for the guessing problem has the same limiting value.
Let Ln be a minimal length function that attains En,l(R, ρ). Arrange the elements of Xn in the decreasing order of their
probabilities. Furthermore, ensure that all sequences belonging to the same type occur together. Enumerate the sequences from
0 to |X|n − 1. Henceforth we refer to a message by its index.
We claim that we may assume Ln is a nondecreasing function of the message index. Suppose this is not the case. Let j be the
first index where the nondecreasing property is violated, i.e. Ln(i) ≤ Ln(i+1) for i = 1, · · · , j − 1, and Ln(j) > Ln(j +1).
Identify the smallest index j∗ that satisfies Ln(j∗) > Ln(j + 1). Modify the lengths as follows: set L′n(j∗) = Ln(j + 1),
then L′n(i + 1) = Ln(i) for i = j∗, · · · , j, and leave the rest unchanged. Call the new set of lengths Ln. In effect, we have
“bubbled” Ln(j+1) towards the smaller indices to the nearest location that does not violate the nondecreasing condition. The
new set of lengths will have the same or lower E
[(
min{2Ln(Xn , 2nR})ρ]. By the optimality of the original set of lengths,
the new lengths are also optimal. Furthermore, as a consequence of the modification, the location of the first index where
Ln(i)  Ln(i + 1) has strictly increased. Continue the process until it terminates; it will after a finite number of steps. The
resulting Ln is nondecreasing and optimal.
Next, observe that
2Ln(i) ≥ i+ 1 (32)
because the length functions are such that the sequences are uniquely decipherable. Another way to see (32) is to observe that
index i is the i+1st guess when guessing in the increasing order of Ln as prescribed by the indices, and therefore (8) implies
(32).
9We then have the following sequence of inequalities∑
an∈Xn
Pn(a
n)
(
min
{
2Ln(a
n), 2nR
})ρ
≥ Pn(xn)
∑
an∈Txn
(
min
{
2Ln(a
n), 2nR
})ρ
(33)
≥ Pn(xn)
i0(Txn )+|Txn |−1∑
i=i0(Txn )
(
min
{
i+ 1, 2nR
})ρ (34)
≥ Pn(xn)
|Txn |∑
i=1
(
min
{
i, 2nR
})ρ (35)
≥ Pn(xn)
∫ |Txn |
0
(
min
{
y, 2nR
})ρ
dy
≥ Pn(xn)|Txn | 1
1 + ρ
(
min
{|Txn |, 2nR})ρ (36)
≥ P{Txn} 1
1 + ρ
(
min
{
2nH(Qxn )−nε(n), 2nR
})ρ
(37)
≥ 2
−2nε(n)
1 + ρ
2n(ρmin{H(Qxn ),R}−D(Qxn‖P )), (38)
where (33) follows by restricting the sum to sequences in type Txn , (34) follows because of (32) and by setting i0(Txn) as
the starting index of type Txn . We can do this because our ordering clustered all sequences of the same type. Inequality (35)
holds because every term under the summation is lower bounded by the corresponding term on the right side. Inequality (36)
follows because of the following. For simplicity, let |Txn | = N and 2nR =M . When N ≤M ,
1
N
∫ N
0
yρ dy =
Nρ
1 + ρ
,
and when N > M ,
1
N
∫ N
0
(min {y,M})ρ dy
=
1
N
∫ M
0
yρ dy +
1
N
∫ N
M
Mρ dy
=
M
N
Mρ
1 + ρ
+
(
1− M
N
)
Mρ
≥ M
ρ
1 + ρ
.
Inequality (37) follows from (30) and (38) follows from (29).
The type Txn in (38) is arbitrary. Moreover, D(Q ‖ P ) and H(Q) are continuous functions of Q, and the set of rational
empirical functions {Qxn} become dense in the class of unifilar sources with |S| states and |X| alphabets, as n → ∞. From
(38) and the above facts, we get lim infn→∞En,l(R, ρ) ≥ E(R, ρ).
To show the other direction, we define a universal encoding for the class of unifilar sources on state space S with alphabet X.
Given a sequence xn, encode each one of the |S|(|X| − 1) source parameters {qxn(x | s)} estimated from xn. Each parameter
requires log(n + 1) bits. Then use nH(Qxn) bits to encode the index of xn within the type Txn . The resulting description
length can be set to
L∗n(x
n) = nH(Qxn) + |S|(|X| − 1) log(n+ 1),
where we have ignored constants arising from integral length constraints. We call this strategy the minimum description length
coding and L∗n the minimum description lengths.
L∗n depends on xn only through its type Txn . Moreover, there are at most (n + 1)|S|(|X|−1) types. Using these facts, (27),
and (28), we get
E
[(
min
{
2L
∗
n(X
n), 2nR
})ρ]
(39)
≤ (n+ 1)(1+ρ)|S|(|X|−1) (40)
· max
Txn⊆Xn
P{Txn}min
{
2nρH(Qxn ), 2nρR
}
(41)
≤ (n+ 1)(1+ρ)|S|(|X|−1)2nE(R,ρ). (42)
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Take logarithms and normalize by n to get
lim sup
n→∞
En,l(R, ρ) ≤ E(R, ρ).
This completes the proof.
The minimum description length coding works without knowledge of the true source parameters. Knowledge of the transition
function φ is sufficient. In the context of guessing, the optimal attack strategy does not depend on knowledge of the source
parameters. Interlacing the exhaustive key-search attack with the attack based on increasing description lengths is asymptotically
optimal. Incidentally, the encryption strategy of Merhav and Arikan [2, Th. 1] uses only type information for encoding, and
is applicable to unifilar sources. The same arguments in the proof of [2, Th. 1] go to show that their encryption strategy is
asymptotically optimal for unifilar sources.
Let us define the quantity
E(ρ)
∆
= max
Q
[ρH(Q)−D(Q ‖ P )] . (43)
Observe that E(ρ) = E(R, ρ) for R ≥ log |X|, i.e., E(ρ) determines the guessing exponent under perfect encryption. The
following result identifies useful properties of these functions.
Proposition 13: E(ρ) is a convex function of ρ. E(ρ,R) is a convex function of ρ and a concave function of R.
Proof: Equation (43) is a maximum of affine functions of ρ and is therefore convex in ρ. The same is the case for
E(R, ρ). To see the concavity of E(R, ρ) in R, write (31) as done in [2, Sec. IV] as
E(R, ρ)
= max
Q
[
ρ min
0≤θ≤ρ
[θH(Q) + (ρ− θ)R]−D(Q ‖ P )
]
= max
Q
min
0≤θ≤ρ
[θH(Q) + (ρ− θ)R −D(Q ‖ P )]
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
max
Q
[θH(Q) + (ρ− θ)R −D(Q ‖ P )] (44)
= min
0≤θ≤ρ
[E(θ) + (ρ− θ)R)] . (45)
The maximization and minimization interchange in (44) is justified because the term within square brackets, sum of a scaled
conditional entropy and the negative of a conditional divergence, is indeed concave in Q and affine in θ. Since (45) is a
minimum of affine functions in R, it is concave in R.
It is easy to see the following fact for a unifilar source:
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
( ∑
xn∈Xn
Pn(x
n)1/(1+ρ)
)1+ρ
= E(ρ). (46)
That the left side in (46) is at least as large as the right side follows from the proof in [6, Appendix B] and the observation
that ρH(Q) −D(Q ‖ P ) is continuous in Q and that the set of rational empirical PMFs Qxn is dense in the set of unifilar
sources with state space S and alphabet X, as n→∞. The other direction is an easy application of the method of types. The
initial state which is implicit in Pn does not affect the value of the limit (as one naturally expects in this Markov case). In the
memoryless case, i.e., when si = xi, and P (x|s) is independent of s, this quantity converges to E(ρ) = ρH1/(1+ρ)(P ) where
H1/(1+ρ)(P ) is the Re´nyi entropy of the DMS P on X.
Analogous to a DMS case, we can characterize the behavior of E(R, ρ) as a function of R for a particular source P .
Proposition 14: For a given ρ > 0 and a unifilar source, let E′(ρ) exist. Then
E(R, ρ) =


ρR, R < H,
(ρ− θ0)R + E(θ0), H ≤ R ≤ E′(ρ),
E(ρ), R > E′(ρ)
where θ0 ∈ [0, ρ] in the second case.
Proof: Indeed, from (45) it is clear by the continuity of the term within square brackets that for all values of R,
E(R, ρ) = (ρ− θ0)R+ E(θ0) for some θ0 ∈ [0, ρ], and the second case is directly proved.
Suppose R < H . Then we may choose Q = P in (31) to get E(R, ρ) ≥ ρR. However, (25) indicates that E(R, ρ) ≤ ρR,
which leads us to conclude that E(R, ρ) = ρR when R < H .
Next observe that E(R, ρ) ≤ E(ρ) is direct for all values of R, and in particular for R > E′(ρ). To show the reverse
direction, (45) yields
E(R, ρ) = min
0≤θ≤ρ
[E(θ) + (ρ− θ)R]
= E(ρ) + min
0≤θ≤ρ
(ρ− θ)
(
R− E(ρ)− E(θ)
ρ− θ
)
.
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The proof will be complete if we can show that the term within parentheses is nonnegative for 0 ≤ θ ≤ ρ. This holds because
of the following. By the convexity of E(θ), the largest value of (E(ρ)−E(θ))/(ρ− θ) for the given range of θ is E′(ρ) (see
for example, Royden [12, Lemma 5.5.16]), and this is upper bounded by R.
For a DMS, Merhav and Arikan [2] show that E′(ρ) = H(Pρ), where Pρ is the PMF given by
Pρ(x) =
P (x)1/(1+ρ)∑
a∈X P (a)
1/(1+ρ)
. (47)
They also show that θ0 is the unique solution to R = H(Pθ).
V. LARGE DEVIATIONS PERFORMANCE
A. General Sources With Memory
We now study the problem of large deviations in guessing and its relation to source compression. Our goal is to extend
the large deviations results of Merhav and Arikan [2] to sources with memory using the tight relationship between guessing
functions and length functions. We begin with the following general result.
Proposition 15: 1) When B > R > 0, there is an attack strategy that satisfies
sup
fn
Pn
{
G(Xn | Y ) ≥ 2nB} = 0
for all sufficiently large n.
2) When B ≤ R, there is an attack strategy that satisfies
sup
fn
Pn
{
G(Xn | Y ) ≥ 2nB}
≤ min
Ln
Pn {Ln(Xn) ≥ nB − 1} .
3) When B < R, there is an encryption function fn such that
Pn
{
Gfn(X
n | Y ) ≥ 2nB}
≥ 1
3
·min
Ln
Pn {Ln(Xn) ≥ nB + 1 + log cn} .
Remarks: When B = R, the large deviations behavior of guessing and coding may differ. If we define
Fn(R,B)
∆
= inf
fn
[
− 1
n
logPn
{
Gfn(X
n|Y ) ≥ 2nB}] (48)
and
Fn,l(B)
∆
= max
Ln
[
− 1
n
logPn
{
Ln(X
n) ≥ 2nB}] , (49)
then Fn(R,B) = ∞ for all sufficiently large n if R < B. When R > B, Fn(R,B) is bounded between Fn,l(B − 1/n) and
Fn,l(B + (1 + log cn)/n)) ignoring vanishing terms.
Proof: Observe first that for any encryption function, the strategy (18) requires at most 2nR+1 guesses. If B > R,
2nB > 2nR+1 for all sufficiently large n, and therefore
sup
fn
Pn
{
G(Xn|Y ) ≥ 2nB} = 0.
When B ≤ R, the same strategy with an optimal Ln that minimizes Pn{Ln(Xn) ≥ nB − 1} requires G(xn | y) ≤
2min
{
2L(x
n), 2nR
}
guesses. Hence {
G(xn | y) ≥ 2nB} ⊆ {Ln(xn) ≥ nB − 1}
and therefore
Pn{G(Xn | Y ) ≥ 2nB} ≤ Pn{Ln(Xn) ≥ nB − 1}.
Since this is true for any encryption function fn, the second statement follows. The attack G(· | y) given by (18) interlaces
guesses in the increasing order of the Ln that attains the minimum in minLn Pn {Ln(Xn) ≥ nB − 1} with the exhaustive
key-search strategy.
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Next, let B < R and consider the encryption strategy given in the proof of Proposition 8 with N = M⌈|X|n/M⌉ (with
dummy messages possibly appended) and M = 2nR. Let GPn denote guessing in the increasing order of Pn-probabilities.
Once again we refer to messages by their indices. For the optimal guessing strategy Gfn , we have
Pn
{
Gfn(X
n | Y ) ≥ 2nB}
=
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=2nB−1
Pn {Xn = jM + i}
≥
N/M−1∑
j=0
Pn {Xn = (j + 1)M − 1}
(
M − 2nB)
≥
N/M−1∑
j=0
M−1∑
i=0
Pn {Xn = (j + 1)M + i}M − 2
nB
M
=
(
1− 2
nB
M
) N−1∑
m=M
Pn {Xn = m}
≥ 1
2
N−1∑
m=M
Pn {Xn = m} ,
where the last inequality follows because B < R. (When B = R, the lower bound is 0 and this technique does not work).
Also, rather trivially,
Pn
{
Gfn(X
n | Y ) ≥ 2nB} ≥ M−1∑
m=2nB−1
Pn {Xn = m} .
Putting these together, we get
N−1∑
m=2nB−1
Pn {Xn = m} = Pn
{
GPn(X
n) ≥ 2nB}
≤ 3Pn
{
Gfn(X
n | Y ) ≥ 2nB} .
Since {LGPn (xn) ≥ nB + 1 + log cn} ⊆ {GPn(xn) ≥ 2nB}, we get
Pn{Gfn(Xn | Y ) ≥ 2nB}
≥ 1
3
· Pn{LGPn (Xn) ≥ nB + 1 + log cn}
≥ 1
3
·min
Ln
Pn{Ln(Xn) ≥ nB + 1 + log cn},
and this concludes the proof.
B. Unifilar Sources
In this subsection, we specialize the result of Proposition 15 to unifilar sources.
Corollary 16: For a unifilar source,
F (R,B)
∆
= lim
n→∞
Fn(R,B) =
{ ∞, B > R,
F (B), B < R,
where
F (B)
∆
= min
Q:H(Q)≥B
D(Q ‖ P )
is the source coding error exponent for the unifilar source.
Proof: This follows straightforwardly from the remarks immediately following Proposition 15 if we can show that
limn→∞ Fn,l(B) = F (B) and that F (B) is continuous in (0, log |X|). This was proved by Merhav in [6, Sec. III].
We remark that the optimal attack strategy does not depend on the source parameters. Guessing in the increasing order
description lengths, interlaced with the exhaustive key-search attack is an asymptotically optimal attack. Furthermore, as is the
case for guessing moments, the encryption strategy of Merhav and Arikan [2, Th. 2] is easily verified to be an asymptotically
optimal encryption strategy for unifilar sources when B < R.
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E(R, ρ) and F (R,B) for unifilar sources are related via the Fenchel-Legendre transform, i.e.,
E(R, ρ) = sup
B>0
[ρB − F (R,B)]
and
F (R,B) = sup
ρ>0
[ρB − E(R, ρ)] .
The proof is identical to that of [2, Th. 3] where this result is proved for DMSs.
C. Finite-State Sources
We now consider the larger class of finite state sources. The Lempel-Ziv coding strategy [5] asymptotically achieves the
entropy rate of a finite-state source without knowledge of the source parameters. It is therefore natural to consider its use in
attacking a cipher system that attempts to securely transmit a message put out by a finite-state source. Our next goal is to
show that guessing in the increasing order of Lempel-Ziv coding lengths has an interesting universality property.
Let ULZ : Xn → N be the length function for the Lempel-Ziv code [5]. The following theorem due to Merhav [6] indicates
that the Lempel-Ziv algorithm is asymptotically optimal in achieving the minimum probability of buffer overflow.
Theorem 17 (Merhav [6]): For any length function Ln, every finite-state source Pn, every Bn ∈ (nH, n log |X|) where H
is the entropy-rate of the source Pn, and all sufficiently large n,
Pn{ULZ(Xn) ≥ Bn + nε(n)}
≤ (1 + δ(n)) · Pn{Ln(Xn) ≥ Bn} (50)
where ε(n) = Θ(1/
√
logn) is a positive sequence that depends on |X| and |S|, and δ(n) = n22−nε(n).
Remark: Merhav’s result [6, Th. 1] assumes that Bn = nB for a constant B ∈ (H, log |X|), but the proof is valid for any
sequence Bn ∈ (nH, n log |X|).
Let GLZ be the short-hand notation for the more cumbersome GULZ , the guessing function associated with ULZ . Let cn
be as given in (4) with Xn replacing X. Furthermore, for the key-constrained cipher system, let GLZ(· | y) denote the attack
of guessing in the order prescribed by GLZ interlaced with the exhaustive key-search attack. Observe that GLZ(· | y) needs
knowledge of fn.
Theorem 18: For any guessing function Gn, every finite-state source Pn, every B ∈ (H, log |X|) where H is the entropy-rate
of the source Pn, and all sufficiently large n,
Pn
{
n−1 logGLZ(X
n) ≥ B + ε(n) + γ(n)}
≤ (1 + δ(n)) · Pn
{
n−1 logGn(X
n) ≥ B} (51)
where ε(n) and δ(n) are the sequences in (50), and γ(n) = (1 + log cn)/n = Θ(n−1 logn).
For the key-rate constrained cipher system, let B < R. Then for any encryption function, we have
Pn
{
n−1 logGLZ(X
n | Y ) ≥ B + 1/n+ ε(n) + γ(n)}
≤ 3(1 + δ(n)) · sup
fn
Pn
{
n−1 logGfn(X
n | Y ) ≥ B}
(52)
for all sufficiently large n.
Remark: Thus the Lempel-Ziv coding strategy provides an asymptotically optimal universal attack strategy for the class of
finite-state sources, in the sense of attaining the limiting value of (48), if the limit exists.
Proof: Observe that
(1 + δ(n))Pn
{
Gn(X
n) ≥ 2nB}
≥ (1 + δ(n))Pn {LGn(Xn) ≥ nB + 1 + log cn} (53)
≥ Pn {ULZ(Xn) ≥ nB + 1 + log cn + nε(n)} (54)
≥ Pn
{
GLZ(X
n) ≥ 2nB+nε(n)+nγ(n)
}
, (55)
where (53) follows from the first inclusion in (10), and (54) from (50). The last inequality (55) follows from (11). This proves
the first part.
To show the second part, we use Proposition 15.3 and Theorem 17 as follows: for all sufficiently large n,
3(1 + δ(n)) sup
fn
Pn
{
Gfn(X
n | Y ) ≥ 2nB}
≥ (1 + δ(n))Pn {Ln(Xn) ≥ nB + nγ(n)}
≥ Pn {ULZ(Xn) ≥ nB + nγ(n) + nε(n)}
≥ Pn
{
GLZ(X
n | Y ) ≥ 2nB+1+nγ(n)+nε(n)
}
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where the last inequality holds for any arbitrary encryption function with GLZ(· | y) being the interlaced attack strategy.
Observe that ε(n) + γ(n) = Θ(1/
√
log n). For unifilar sources, a result analogous to Theorem 18 can be shown with
ε(n) + γ(n) = Θ(n−1 logn). Guessing for this class of sources proceeds in the order of increasing description lengths. This
conclusion follows from a result analogous to Theorem 17 on the asymptotic optimality of minimum description coding (see
Merhav [6, Sec. III]).
D. Competitive Optimality
We now demonstrate a competitive optimality property for GLZ . From [6, eqn. (28)] extended to finite-state sources, we
have for any competing code Ln
Pn{ULZ(Xn) > Ln(Xn) + nε(n)}
≤ Pn{ULZ(Xn) < Ln(Xn) + nε(n)} (56)
where ε(n) = Θ((log logn)/(logn)). From (8) and (6), we get
ULZ(x
n) ≥ logGLZ(xn)
and
logG(xn) ≥ LG(xn)− 1− log cn,
respectively. We therefore conclude that
{logGLZ(xn) > logG(xn) + n(ε(n) + γ(n))}
⊆ {ULZ(xn) > LG(xn) + nε(n)}
and that
{ULZ(xn) < LG(xn) + nε(n)}
⊆ {logGLZ(xn) < logG(xn) + n(ε(n) + γ(n))}.
From these two inclusions and (56), we easily deduce the following result.
Theorem 19: For any finite-state source and any competing guessing function G, we have
Pn{logGLZ(Xn) > logG(Xn) + nε′(n)}
≤ Pn{logGLZ(Xn) < logG(Xn) + nε′(n)}
where ε′(n) = ε(n) + γ(n).
For unifilar sources, the above sequence of arguments for minimum description length coding and [6, eqn. (28)] imply that
we may take ε′(n) = Θ(n−1 logn).
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied two measures of cryptographic security based on guessing, for sources with memory. The first one
was based on guessing moments and the second on large deviations performance of the number of guesses. We identified an
asymptotically optimal encryption strategy that orders the messages in the decreasing order of their probabilities, enumerates
them, and then encrypts as many least-significant bits as there are key bits. We also identified an optimal attack strategy based
on a length function that attains the optimal value for a source coding problem. Both these strategies need knowledge of the
message probabilities.
We then specialized our results to the case of unifilar sources, gave formulas for computing the two measures of performance,
and argued that the optimal encryption strategy as well as the optimal attack strategy depended on the source parameters only
through the number of states and letters, i.e., the optimal encryption and attack strategies are universal for this class.
We also showed that an attack strategy based on the Lempel-Ziv coding lengths is asymptotically optimal for the class
of finite state sources. Finally, we provided competitive optimality results for guessing in the order of increasing description
lengths and Lempel-Ziv lengths.
We end this paper with a short list of related open problems.
• Consider a modification to the encryption technique of Proposition 8 where the messages are enumerated in the increasing
order of their Lempel-Ziv lengths instead of message probabilities. Does this ordering lead to an asymptotically optimal
encryption strategy? Such a strategy would not depend on the specific knowledge of source parameters.
• It would be of interest to see if the results on guessing moments for unifilar sources can be extended to finite-state sources.
• The large deviations behavior of guessing when B = R is not well-understood and might be worth investigating.
• As mentioned in [2], one might wish to consider a scenario where only a noisy version of the cryptogram is available to
the attacker. The degradation in the attacker’s performance could be quantified.
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